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19 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: COPD

SUBJECT: CIA Reports to the PSB

25X1A 1. On Monday 17 November an informal meeting was held in this branch with [REDACTED] and Messrs. [REDACTED] of the PSB Office of Evaluation to explore effective means of meeting the PSB's evaluation requirements upon CIA.

2. Two possibilities were considered: (a) to supplement the condensed, generalized reports which CIA is now submitting for incorporation (without change of substance) in the PSB reports to the NSC, by means of follow-up discussion among responsible representatives of the area divisions, the PP staffs, and the PSB Office of Evaluation; and (b) to use of CIA covert agents as on-the-spot observers for planning and evaluation purposes -- such individuals to serve CIA purposes primarily, but to be available under CIA auspices for covert debriefing by members of the PSB Evaluation Staff.

25X1A 3. These two measures, which are thought of in connection with the relatively specific and intensive evaluation of the CIA PW program in individual countries rather than with the semi-annual reports covering the worldwide effort, were regarded favorably by all those present. It was understood that the second would require a highly qualified individual and that, in the absence of such a person, it should not be attempted. [REDACTED] had in mind for Italy a particular man known to Mr. [REDACTED] who reacted very positively on the basis of that man's qualifications.

4. The need of additional measures for confirming the factual basis of generalizations reported by CIA, and for interpreting the generalizations themselves, is suggested by a comparison of evaluation statements made in the three different reports on Italy by this branch, by WE-4, and by WE/PP acting for CWE. In our initial evaluation designed for purposes of internal corrective action, we stated: "The total effort was slight in relation to the importance of the area and to the magnitude of the Communist threat. While CIA could not be expected at this period in its history to match the Communist threat, it is believed that in the light of total CIA resources, greater effort could and should have been made." WE-4, in its concrete and well-balanced draft of the report for the PSB, referred to the part played by U.S. psychological warfare as a whole in the attainment of U.S. objectives in Italy as "small," and to CIA's own contribution as "modest." WE/PP changed these two words to "significant" and "reflected in positive results."

5. Although this

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5. Although this sounds like double-talk, each version of this and other inconsistencies can be defended. The important thing is the broader context of each writer's assumptions as to standards (absolute or relative), and it is probably neither feasible nor secure to try to explain this in writing. On the other hand, if it is not explained, any system of reporting to the PSB is likely to be of slight usefulness to that agency or CIA and may result in damaging decisions based on misunderstandings.

25X1A 6. As I affirmed yesterday, I believe that the report on Italy in its final form meets the technical requirements imposed by the PSB and does no discredit to CIA. Moreover, if we may safely judge by what Messrs. [REDACTED] indicated as to the response of other agencies to the annual and quarterly reports, the CIA report on Italy is probably at least as responsive to the real requirement as any the PSB is likely to get from its other members. Nevertheless, it omits, among other things, specific examples of operational activities which CIA has been restrained from undertaking as a result of inability to reach necessary agreements with State and NSA; these are the very situations -- WE-4 is prepared to cite a number of them -- in which the PSB could bring its weight to bear on our behalf. The PSB can hardly become an effective instrument of the Government or provide policy and other support to CIA unless it has knowledge of such matters on which it can act.

25X1A 7. It is recommended that you discuss this subject with [REDACTED] with a view to arranging to meet in the near future with Dr. [REDACTED] of the PSB Office of Evaluation, for the purpose of reaching a general understanding on evaluation problems and requirements. 25X1A

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Acting Chief, OPS/EVAL

OPS/EVAL/WRJ/gw

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